Imperva version 11.5 suffers from a bypass vulnerability by confusing the HTTP Pollution Normalization Engine.
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Bypass Imperva by confusing HTTP Pollution Normalization Engine
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Author: Wiswat Aswamenakul
Environment: Tested with Imperva Version: 11.5 and Web Backend as IIS + ASP
Description:
One of technique that attackers use to bypass web application firewall is
to use HTTP pollution attack. The attack can be produced by sending
parameters with the same name to web application and the result on the web
application will depend on which web server and language used on the
server. IIS and ASP will combine all the value together separated each one
with "," (comma). For example,
http://www.example.com/sqli.asp?a=first&a=second
The page sqli.asp will see "a" parameter as "first,second" (without double
quote). Therefore, attackers could craft attack string as following:
http://www.example.com/sqli.asp?a=nonexist'/*&a=*/or/*&a=*/1=1/*&a=*/--+-
The page sqli.asp will sess "a" parameter as "'/*,*/or/*,*/1=1/*,*/--+-"
(without double quote).
Some web application firewall will fail detecting this attack. However,
Imperva handles this type of attack by combining all the parameters with
same name like IIS+ASP does (I call it normalization engine) before passing
the end result to detection engine.
However, I have found that there is a trick, bug, vulnerability, feature,
(you name it) that allows the normalization engine to create end results
different from IIS+ASP does.
[+] Attack that can be detected by Imperva
http://www.example.com/sqli.asp?a=nonexist'/*&a=*/or/*&a=*/1=1/*&a=*/--+-
[+] Attack that can bypass Imperva
http://www.example.com/sqli.asp?a=nonexist'/*&a%00=*/or/*&a=*/1=1/*&a%00=*/--+-
*Please notice the %00 in parameter name
Imperva treats a and a%00 as different parameters. As a result, when
combining the parameter with the same name, it will not see a valid attack
string. On the other hand, IIS+ASP see a and a%00 as the same parameters.
Apache and PHP also see a and a%00 as the same parameters. Other
combinations have not been tested yet.
PS. Other web application firewall might be tricked by this technique to
bypass their detection but I don't have devices for testing.