EDB-ID: 41798 | Author: Google Security Research | Published: 2017-04-04 | CVE: CVE-2017-2489 | Type: Dos | Platform: macOS | Aliases: N/A | Advisory/Source: Link | Tags: Denial of Service (DoS) | Vulnerable App: N/A | Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1069
MacOS kernel memory disclosure due to lack of bounds checking in AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability
Selector 0x710 of IntelFBClientControl ends up in AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability.
This method takes a structure input and output buffer. It reads an attacker controlled dword from the input buffer which it
uses to index an array of pointers with no bounds checking:
AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability(AGDCFBGetDisplayCapability_t *, AGDCFBGetDisplayCapability_t *)
__text:000000000002A3AB mov r14, rdx ; output buffer, readable from userspace
__text:000000000002A3AE mov rbx, rsi ; input buffer, controlled from userspace
...
__text:000000000002A3B8 mov eax, [rbx] ; read dword
__text:000000000002A3BA mov rsi, [rdi+rax*8+0E40h] ; use as index for small inline buffer in this object
__text:000000000002A3C2 cmp byte ptr [rsi+1DCh], 0 ; fail if byte at +0x1dc is 0
__text:000000000002A3C9 jz short ___fail
__text:000000000002A3CB add rsi, 1E0Dh ; otherwise, memcpy from that pointer +0x1e0dh
__text:000000000002A3D2 mov edx, 1D8h ; 0x1d8 bytes
__text:000000000002A3D7 mov rdi, r14 ; to the buffer which will be sent back to userspace
__text:000000000002A3DA call _memcpy
For this PoC we try to read the pointers at 0x2000 byte boundaries after this allocation; with luck there will be a vtable
pointer there which will allow us to read back vtable contents and defeat kASLR.
With a bit more effort this could be turned into an (almost) arbitrary read by for example spraying the kernel heap with the desired read target
then using a larger offset hoping to land in one of the sprayed buffers. A kernel arbitrary read would, for example, allow you to read the sandbox.kext
HMAC key and forge sandbox extensions if it still works like that.
tested on MacOS Sierra 10.12.2 (16C67)
*/
// ianbeer
// build: clang -o capri_mem capri_mem.c -framework IOKit
#if 0
MacOS kernel memory disclosure due to lack of bounds checking in AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability
Selector 0x710 of IntelFBClientControl ends up in AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability.
This method takes a structure input and output buffer. It reads an attacker controlled dword from the input buffer which it
uses to index an array of pointers with no bounds checking:
AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability(AGDCFBGetDisplayCapability_t *, AGDCFBGetDisplayCapability_t *)
__text:000000000002A3AB mov r14, rdx ; output buffer, readable from userspace
__text:000000000002A3AE mov rbx, rsi ; input buffer, controlled from userspace
...
__text:000000000002A3B8 mov eax, [rbx] ; read dword
__text:000000000002A3BA mov rsi, [rdi+rax*8+0E40h] ; use as index for small inline buffer in this object
__text:000000000002A3C2 cmp byte ptr [rsi+1DCh], 0 ; fail if byte at +0x1dc is 0
__text:000000000002A3C9 jz short ___fail
__text:000000000002A3CB add rsi, 1E0Dh ; otherwise, memcpy from that pointer +0x1e0dh
__text:000000000002A3D2 mov edx, 1D8h ; 0x1d8 bytes
__text:000000000002A3D7 mov rdi, r14 ; to the buffer which will be sent back to userspace
__text:000000000002A3DA call _memcpy
For this PoC we try to read the pointers at 0x2000 byte boundaries after this allocation; with luck there will be a vtable
pointer there which will allow us to read back vtable contents and defeat kASLR.
With a bit more effort this could be turned into an (almost) arbitrary read by for example spraying the kernel heap with the desired read target
then using a larger offset hoping to land in one of the sprayed buffers. A kernel arbitrary read would, for example, allow you to read the sandbox.kext
HMAC key and forge sandbox extensions if it still works like that.
tested on MacOS Sierra 10.12.2 (16C67)
