### Microsoft Windows 10 - WLDP/MSHTML CLSID UMCI Bypass

EDB-ID: 42997
   Windows: WLDP/MSHTML CLSID UMCI Bypass   Platform: Windows 10 S (thought should be anything with UMCI)  Class: Security Feature Bypass    Summary:  The enlightened lockdown policy check for COM Class instantiation can be bypassed in MSHTML hosts leading to arbitrary code execution on a system with UMCI enabled (e.g. Device Guard)    Description:    Scripting hosts are supposed to check against the Windows Lockdown Policy (WLDP) before instantiating arbitrary COM classes. This is typically done by calling WldpIsClassInApprovedList from WLDP.DLL before instantiating any COM class. For example in the case of JScript’s ActiveXObject the ProgID is passed to CLSIDFromProgID by the script host and the resulting CLSID is passed to WLDP to determine what’s allowed.    It’s possible to circumvent this check by using the COM TreatAs key to redirect one of the limited (8) allowed CLSIDs to an arbitrary class and get it instantiated. However you can’t do this using ActiveXObject as CLSIDFromProgID will return the resulting CLSID from looking up TreatAs. That said there is a race condition here. However in an MSHTML Local Machine Zone scenario you can bypass it by using an OBJECT tag. In this case MSHTML parses the classid attribute and checks that CLSID against WLDP. It then proceeds to create it using CoCreateInstance which follows TreatAs and creates a different object.    This does require modification of the registry to work, but I think that’s in scope. The reason I’m reporting this one is I think it’s a bug in MSHTML, rather than in an application you can easily block (at least if you want to disable    Proof of Concept:    I’ve provided a PoC is two files, a text file to set-up the registry and a HTML file. The registry file is in the REGINI format which allows it to work on Win10S as while reg.exe and regedit.exe are blocked regini.exe isn’t. The HTML file can be run inside IE or my prefered option HTML Help. You could even make the PoC file a CHM but I didn’t. The PoC can bootstrap things like untrusted .NET but for simplicity it doesn’t.    1) Unpack the PoC and ensure the HTML file does NOT have MOTW.  2) From the explorer Run dialog execute “regini path\to\keys.txt”  3) Execute the HTML file from the Run dialog using “hh path\to\shell.html”    Expected Result:  The class creation should fail.    Observed Result:  The class creation succeeded and the HTML file executed notepad.      Proof of Concept:  https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/42997.zip