QEMU version 2.10 suffers from an NBD server long export name stack buffer overflow vulnerability. This was introduced with commit f37708f6b8.
cd918a363b2e2a85e3195712b7c48c43Introduced in commit f37708f6b8 (2.10). The NBD spec says a client
can request export names up to 4096 bytes in length, even though
they should not expect success on names longer than 256. However,
qemu hard-codes the limit of 256, and fails to filter out a client
that probes for a longer name; the result is a stack smash that can
potentially give an attacker arbitrary control over the qemu
process.
The smash can be easily demonstrated with this client:
$ qemu-io f raw nbd://localhost:10809/$(printf %3000d 1 | tr ' ' a)
If the qemu NBD server binary (whether the standalone qemu-nbd, or
the builtin server of QMP nbd-server-start) was compiled with
-fstack-protector-strong, the ability to exploit the stack smash
into arbitrary execution is a lot more difficult (but still
theoretically possible to a determined attacker, perhaps in
combination with other CVEs). Still, crashing a running qemu (and
losing the VM) is bad enough, even if the attacker did not obtain
full execution control.