XMeye P2P Cloud Remote Code Execution / Integrity Issues

XMeye P2P Cloud used with Xiongmai IP Cameras, NVRs and DVRs suffer from predictable Cloud IDs, default admin password, and various other issues that can result in remote code execution.

MD5 | a15fae239526f5d8cd72ff3aed5b1d4c

SEC Consult also published a blog post regarding the identified security issues
with further background information:

Blog: https://r.sec-consult.com/xmeye

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20181009-0 >
title: Remote Code Execution via XMeye P2P Cloud
product: Xiongmai IP Cameras, NVRs and DVRs
incl. 3rd party OEM devices
vulnerable version: see below
fixed version: -
CVE number: CVE-2018-17915, CVE-2018-17917, CVE-2018-17919
impact: Critical
homepage: http://www.xiongmaitech.com/en/
found: 2018-03-05
by: Stefan ViehbAPck (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

An integrated part of SEC Consult
Europe | Asia | North America



Vendor description:
"Hangzhou Xiongmai Technology Co., Ltd concentrates on security surveillance,
Video intelligent research and development. We devote ourselves to
providing good products, technical services for manufacturers,
wholesaler and service provider, in order to offer better experience
for our customers. We are global leading providers in security video
products and technology. Established from 2009, many years development,
the headquarter of XM locate in Yinhu Innovation Center, Fuyang
district, Hangzhou now. Total registered capital reach to 60 million.
Now we owns nearly 2000 employees including a strong R&D team (more
than 300 experienced engineers)."

Source: http://www.xiongmaitech.com/en/index.php/about/company/18

Business recommendation:
SEC Consult has identified highly critical vulnerabilities in Xiongmai
products and the "XMeye P2P Cloud" feature which is being used in many
3rd party OEM devices as well.

The vendor does not provide proper mitigations and hence it is recommended
not to use any products associated with the XMeye P2P Cloud until
all of the identified security issues have been fixed and a thorough
security analysis has been performed by professionals.

Vulnerability overview/description:
1) Predictable XMEye Cloud IDs (CVE-2018-17915)
All Xiongmai devices come with a feature called "XMeye P2P Cloud". It is a
proprietary, UDP-based protocol that allows users to access their IP cameras or
NVRs/DVRs via the internet. The feature is enabled by default, no setup by the
user is required.

The device initiates and keeps a connection to a Xiongmai cloud server.
All connections between clients and the devices are established via Xiongmai
cloud servers. This approach allows users to connect to devices that are behind
firewalls, NATed etc.

The unique, per-device identifier is the cloud ID. It is a 16 character long
hexadecimal string (e.g. f7e708f21de0fde0).

Anyone who knows the device identifier and the admin credentials can establish a
connection to a device using the XMEye apps (Android, iOS) or a "VMS" desktop

The Cloud ID may be unique, but it is not random. It is derived (at boot time)
from the device MAC address using a few simple operations (see get_sn_from_mac())

An attacker can enumerate potential MACs/cloud IDs and find valid ones.
Then use the weak default credentials to log in. This allows the attacker to
watch the video feed, change the device configuration and possibly gain remote
code execution using other vulnerabilities.

The XMEye functionality allows an attacker to attack devices that are behind
firewalls, NATed networks etc.

MAC addresses have a well defined structure: 3-octet OUI (Vendor) + 3-octet NIC ID
OUIs are assigned by the IEEE. Interestingly Xiongmai does not own an OUI, but
instead uses the OUIs of other companies.

The following OUIs are used by Xiongmai devices (OUIs based on internet research,
scanning, company names based on [1]):
001210 WideRay Corp
001211 Protechna Herbst GmbH & Co. KG
001212 PLUS Corporation
001213 Metrohm AG
001214 Koenig & Bauer AG
001215 iStor Networks, Inc.
001216 ICP Internet Communication Payment AG
001217 Cisco-Linksys, LLC
001218 ARUZE Corporation
003E0B - Not assigned

We developed a cloud ID scanner that queries the Xiongmai cloud server. The
responses indicate if there is a device online that uses the given cloud ID,
plus provide the IP of a Xiongmai Cloud hop server that is geographically
close to the device. One query is one UDP packet.

We scanned 0.02% of the devices (random choice) in each OUI range (16 Million
devices per range) and extrapolated the results.

OUI: 001210; IDs checked 3,365; Devices online 3; Success rate: 0.1%;
extrapolated devices online: 14,957
OUI: 001211; IDs checked 3,363; Devices online 9; Success rate: 0.3%;
extrapolated devices online: 44,898
OUI: 001212; IDs checked 3,351; Devices online 492; Success rate: 14.7%;
extrapolated devices online: 2,463,261
OUI: 001213; IDs checked 3,402; Devices online 218; Success rate: 6.4%;
extrapolated devices online: 1,075,083
OUI: 001214; IDs checked 3,440; Devices online 67; Success rate: 1.9%;
extrapolated devices online: 326,765
OUI: 001215; IDs checked 3,347; Devices online 255; Success rate: 7.6%;
extrapolated devices online: 1,278,216
OUI: 001216; IDs checked 3,377; Devices online 448; Success rate: 13.3%;
extrapolated devices online: 2,225,701
OUI: 001217; IDs checked 3,315; Devices online 286; Success rate: 8.6%;
extrapolated devices online: 1,447,446
OUI: 001218; IDs checked 3,196; Devices online 1; Success rate: 0.0%;
extrapolated devices online: 5,249
OUI: 003E0B; IDs checked 4,224; Devices online 21; Success rate: 0.5%;
extrapolated devices online: 83,409

We estimate that there are about **9 Million devices online** in the given
OUI ranges.

The responses from the cloud server allow us to estimate the geographic
distribution of the devices:
Hop server location: CN; extrapolated devices 5,438,757
Hop server location: DE; extrapolated devices 1,319,845
Hop server location: JP; extrapolated devices 577,743
Hop server location: SG; extrapolated devices 697,276
Hop server location: TR; extrapolated devices 189,260
Hop server location: US; extrapolated devices 742,101

We assume the hop server locations serve devices on the same continent.

[1] https://regauth.standards.ieee.org/standards-ra-web/pub/view.html#registries

2) Default admin password
The devices include an empty password for the admin user account which has
the highest privileges on the devices and allows attackers to view the
video feed or change the configuration.

3) Insecure default credentials for user "default" (CVE-2018-17919)
In the default configuration, the user account "default" exists on
the device. The purpose of this user is not documented.

These user credentials can be used to log in to a device via the XMEye
cloud (checked via custom client using the Xiongmai NetSDK [2]).

This user seems to at least have permissions to access video feeds (more
investigation required!).

4) Multiple unencrypted communication channels (CVE-2018-17917)
All device communication is not encrypted. This includes the XMeye service
and firmware update communication.

- An attacker can eavesdrop on video feeds or steal XMeye login
credentials to get control over the device.
- An attacker can also impersonate the update server and offer malicious
firmware updates.

5) Firmware update integrity not checked
Firmware updates are not signed. It is possible to create a firmware
update file that contains malicious code (CWE-494). This is either
possible by modifying the filesystems contained in a firmware update
or modifying the "InstallDesc" file in a firmware update file.
The "InstallDesc" is a text file that contains commands that are
executed during the update.

Combining the vulnerabilities makes a very powerful attack, "The worst
case scenario":
a) Attacker exploits Predictable XMEye Cloud IDs to get list of valid IDs.
b) Attacker exploits Insecure default credentials for user "admin" and
possibly user "default", to get access to devices via the XMEye cloud.
c) Attacker changes the DNS configuration of the devices to impersonate
the update server "upgrade.secu100.net".
d) Attacker sets up fake firmware update webserver.
e) Attacker creates firmware updates containing malicious code.
Imagination is the limit here, could be a Mirai-like agent or something
focused on lateral movement in the target environment (local network of
the organization using the devices).
f) Attacker performs a firmware update on devices via the XMEye cloud API
command H264_DVR_Upgrade_Cloud() (custom client using the Xiongmai NetSDK
[2]). The malicious firmware update is persisted on the devices. If the
attacker desires, it cannot be removed by rebooting the device.

[2] http://www.xiongmaitech.com/service/down_detail/83/185.html

Proof of concept:
1) Predictable XMEye Cloud IDs (CVE-2018-17915)
The Python code to derive the cloud ID from the MAC address of the
device has been removed from this advisory.

2) Default admin password
The default username and password is admin:[BLANK].

3) Insecure default credentials for user "default" (CVE-2018-17919)
The credentials for the hardcoded user "default" are "tluafed"

4) Multiple unencrypted communication channels (CVE-2018-17917)
No proof of concept available for this advisory.

5) Firmware update integrity not checked
The following "InstallDesc" contents would launch an arbitrary command,
in this case starting the telnet daemon.

"UpgradeCommand" : [
"Command" : "Shell",
"Script" : "/bin/busybox telnetd"

Vulnerable / tested products:
Xiongmai acts as an OEM. Various vendors sell branded devices with Xiongmai
hardware/firmware inside.

More information can be found in the blog post: https://r.sec-consult.com/xmeye

Vendor contact timeline:
2018-03-15: Contacting ICS-CERT for coordination support.
2018-03-26: ICS-CERT assigns ICS-VU-638768 for this case
2018-05-04: ICS-CERT provides answer from Xiongmai, the vendor argues that SEC
Consult tested the "old" firmware/devices. Furthermore, per default
user passwords need to be changed upon first login since 2016. They
informed their key customers to update to the latest firmware & change
default passwords.
2018-05-07: SEC Consult anwser: we verified that we are running the latest
firmware versions and they are affected. Furthermore, there is no
password change request implemented.
2018-05-15: SEC Consult sends further/newly identified vulnerabilities to ICS-CERT
for Xiongmai, describing worst case scenario, asking to inform FTC
about this case
2018-05-15: ICS-CERT: Xiongmai is very slow in responding, and requests for
affected firmware versions have been sent to them already.
2018-05-25: Asking ICS-CERT for a status update
2018-05-29: ICS-CERT: small update from Xiongmai received:
--Vendor Response--
Regarding the device information from Researcher, it is our "old"
model and "old" firmware version, that's why there is no more update.
Even for DVR model it is already discontinued, therefore we will work
a new "latest" version based on current baseline version, for those
Researcher's devices specially.
--End Vendor Response--
Xiongmai also said they will provide version numbers for fixed &
vulnerable versions, but no answer.
2018-06-04: ICS-CERT: Xiongmai provided a firmware update for our test devices
2018-06-11: SEC Consult: tested firmware "SimpGeneral_General_AHB7804R-
There are no apparent changes, it uses the same cloud ID, the admin
password is still empty and there are no warnings to change the
password (checked via web interface and VMS software)
2018-06-15: ICS-CERT: received an update from Xiongmai as to why the firmware did
not seem to fix anything:
--Vendor Response--
After check the message we believe there is some misunderstanding on
IE operation due to the Plug-in ( or called as ActiveX ) issues, As
currently this ActiveX technology even is quite an "ancient"
technology but still widely used in most of Video Surveillance
products. The issues that Researcher have met, it is due to his PC
still have "old" plug-in installed, and with new update of firmware we
provided, The camera and NVR already have functions but his PC with
"old" plug-in, it is like using same "old" computer to connect new
devices, that's why he still didn't see anything new.

So the solution is quite simple, just delete and uninstall "old"
Plug-in, and then install new one from devices with new version.
Please kindly check attached file, we have some instructions and
steps, on how to renew this ActiveX, please help to forward to this
Researcher and we believe he could understand the reason, and he could
recheck about the new firmware we had sent.
--End Vendor Response--
2018-06-18: SEC Consult: the ActiveX controls are unrelated to any of the issues
we reported. For the sake of completeness, SEC Consult tested it
anyways and all the security issues are still not fixed. Raising
doubts that the vendor understands the impact.
2018-06-21: ICS-CERT: concurs with our opinion and if Xiongmai does not fix the
issues we will have to publish. Xiongmai did not yet react to the
additional findings reported on 2018-05-15
2018-07-24: ICS-CERT: Xiongmai provided "improved" instructions to help ensure
the forced password change happens.
2018-07-27: SEC Consult: the default admin password is just a small subset of the
identified critical issues. Intention to publish end of September.
Asking further questions to Xiongmai:
- What devices are affected by the vulnerabilities?
- What is the plan/timeline to fix the issues?
- Are there issues that will not be fixed? Why?
- Are there devices that will not receive fixes for the
vulnerabilities? Which ones?
- Will the updates be rolled out automatically or are manual steps by
the user required?
- Will Xiongmai publish a public warning/advisory on their website?
- Will Xiongmai inform their OEM customers about the vulnerabilities
so they can inform end users?
2018-08-01: ICS-CERT: questions & deadline have been passed to Xiongmai.
Possibility of contacting CNCERT/CC.
2018-09-04: ICS-CERT: Still waiting for a response from Xiongmai. CNCERT/CC has
2018-09-24: SEC Consult: Asking for a status update. Proposed release date 8th
October Recommendations are to stop using the devices, other
workarounds are not effective.
2018-09-27: ICS-CERT: CNCERT/CC only replied with generic email response. ICS-CERT
proposes Tuesday or Thursday for releases. Decided for the 9th
2018-10-04: Informing CERT-Bund and CERT.at about the security issues and release
2018-10-09: Coordinated release of security advisory

The vendor did not provide proper mitigations and solution attempts since ICS-CERT
contacted them back in March 2018.

SEC Consult advises not to use the products of Xiongmai and any 3rd party OEM
device associated with the XMeye cloud feature.

There are no workarounds available as the devices are connected via the cloud, the
usual recommendations changing default passwords, strict firewalling and network
segmentation unfortunately do not mitigate the whole range of discovered issues.

Advisory URL:


SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

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Europe | Asia | North America

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EOF Stefan ViehbAPck / @2018

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