HP ThinPro versions 7.1, 7.0, 6.2.1, and 6.2 suffer from a local physical access information disclosure vulnerability.
255ed9d1368d7aa40e9fa99b81e489f7HP ThinPro - Information disclosure
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Identifiers
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* CVE-2019-16285
CVSSv3 score
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6.1 (AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)
Vendor
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HP - [https://www.hp.com](https://www.hp.com)
Product
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Deliver secure desktop virtualization that’s as comfortable for IT as it is
for end users with the stunningly redesigned HP ThinPro. It has a bold new
user interface and workflow refinements that make it a breeze to configure,
manage, and use right out of the box.
Affected versions
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- HP ThinPro Linux 7.1
- HP ThinPro Linux 7.0
- HP ThinPro Linux 6.2.1
- HP ThinPro Linux 6.2
Credit
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Eldar Marcussen - xen1thLabs - Software Labs
Vulnerability summary
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If the thin client is configured with `local user must login` then an
unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the thin client can
extract sensitive information onto a USB drive. This information could then
lead to the attacker gaining administrative access to this device and
others on the network.
Technical details
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An attacker can use the `generate diagnostic` feature under the `system
logs` tab of the `system information` window to generate a tar ball
containing
sensitive files, such as the `/root` directory including `.bash_history`,
the `registry.xml` file from `/writeable/tmp` and `shadow-` from `/etc`.
These files can be found under their relative path under the `files/`
directory in the generated `Diagnostic.tgz`
Proof of concept
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The following evidence is provided to illustrate the existence and
exploitation:
1. Insert USB drive
2. At the login screen press the wrench icon on the login window
3. Press the `i` icon
4. Select the `System Logs` tab
5. Select `Trace` in the dropdown for the Debug level
6. Click the `Diagnostic` button to generate the `Diagnostic.tgz` file
7. Save file to drive
8. On a different computer extract the file
9. Observe the presence and content of the following files:
* `files/etc/shadow-`
* `files/writeable/tmp/registry.xml`
* `files/root/.bash_history`
Solution
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Contact vendor for a solution
Timeline
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Date | Status
------------|-----------------------------
19-AUG-2019 | Reported to vendor
22-NOV-2019 | Patch available
24-MAR-2020 | Public disclosure